Taste is the most common trope when we talk about one’s ability in making aesthetic judgement on artistic object. Hutcheson, in the Treatise I: An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design[1], declares that taste relates to people’s internal sense and cannot be very much improved in a particular individual. On the other hand, in his influential work, Of the Standard of Taste[2], Hume states that taste is the foundation of people’s aesthetic judgements and can be improved through practice. In this paper, I will analyze each of their works critically and seek for the reconciliation between the two seemingly incompatible works. In particular, I will prove that, while Hutcheson starts from a more purely sensible aspect of taste, Hume includes cognitive analysis into sensory feelings and gives his explanation of why taste can be elevated. Afterwards, I will provide my own revision on both theories and argue that, even though everyone has the ability to perceive the idea of beauty, to what extent one can improve his taste still depends on, to a certain degree, his natural sensibility.
In Treatise I, Hutcheson states that the presence of external objects can raise different ideas in human mind, and that “their acting upon our body [or mind] is called sensations (Hutcheson 7).” The power that human beings have of perceiving these ideas are called senses. For example, we can feel the temperature and texture of a glass when we hold it in the hand, because we have the sense of touch. However, Hutcheson thinks that just as the human mind does not have the ability to prevent the perception of the ideas, neither can it vary the idea’s reception as long as the body is fit to receive these ideas. In other words, the mind is passive and takes no control over which ideas can be perceived and how they are received. For example, when the color of red is presented before one, he cannot declare that he sees another color unless he is lying, for the idea produced by the object is immediate, and it goes directly from his physical organ and thus forms the perception in his mind without the examination of his cognition. Therefore, our mind is involuntary when receiving the idea. Moreover, Hutcheson thinks that everyone should have the same in perceiving these ideas, and the same idea cannot evoke different sensations in different individuals. As he states in the essay:
In other words, our knowledge of an object, or our prospective aversion or desire related with the object, might change our rational perceptions, but it can never make our sensible perception any different from what we experienced at the very first time. For example, one might initially find the taste of wine agreeable. This idea is perceived purely by his senses so this agreeableness is his sensible perception. However, after getting drunk and suffering from hangover several times, he no longer likes wine that much because the feeling of hangover recurs with the idea of wine so that whenever he thinks of wine now, he finds it disgusting. He then speculates that he senses have changed so that the agreeable idea produced by wine originally now becomes disagreeable. In this case, Hutcheson would argue that the only thing that has changed is the man’s rational perception. Due to presence of additional idea—the recurrence of the experience of hangover—the man consciously knows that drinking wine cannot be a pleasant experience for him. Therefore, his rational sense alters his desire of the wine. However, his unconscious and passive perception, which is his sensible perception, never changes. The presence of wine still brings about agreeable ideas deep down in his most sensible structures even though he might not even know it. Therefore, people’s senses, according to Hutcheson, should all be the same without existence of additional idea. The only exceptions are cases where the person has bodily flaws. Hutcheson says that “no definition can raise any simple idea which has not been before perceived by the senses (Hutcheson 8).” If one does not have the sense, he can never get the idea of any perception which need to be received by that particular sense. For example, a deaf person can never perceive the sound because he does not have the sensibility for sound, just as an achromate can never discern the differences between colors. Apart from these unusual cases, our senses, the power of perceiving ideas from external objects, are passive and involuntary, and they remain the same in each person, except that the person has physical defects which causes his insensibility. Among all of our senses, there are external senses and internal sense. For each external sense, we depend on a distinct physical organ to receive sensible ideas. For example, we perceive colors from the eye and distinguish sounds from the ear. On the other hand, the internal sense , which can also be called taste, is our power of receiving the ideas of beauty and getting pleasures from them. Besides their difference in the objects of perception (for external senses, the objects are colors, sounds, temperature, etc., and for internal senses, the objects are ideas of beauty), external senses and internal sense are also different in that, while most people are equipped with external senses, there are much fewer people who have internal sense. Hutcheson says that “I should rather choose to call our power of perceiving these ideas as an internal sense, were it only for the convenience of distinguishing them from other sensations of seeing and hearing which men may have without perception of beauty (Hutcheson 10).” He thinks that while all the people, as long as their bodies are fit to receive external sensations, can hear the music performed by an orchestra or identify the colors in a painting, not all of them can sense the idea of beauty, harmony, and regularity. However, although different from external senses, our internal sense is still a sense, which means that it embodies all the characteristics which are inherent in human senses. First of all, the ideas perceived by internal sense are also immediate so that our mind is passive when receiving these ideas. For example, when we receive a pleasant idea of beauty when looking at an artwork, we can never deceive our internal sense and think that we see something ugly, because the idea is produced by the idea of beauty and directly enters into our mind without being analyzed cognitively. Secondly, everyone should have the same ability in perceiving these internal sensations as long as they have this internal sense. If a person with perfect external senses cannot perceive the idea of beauty, it is not because his internal sense has not been explored or practiced, but it is because he does not have this internal sense at all. Just like a blind person can never perceive the idea of color because he does not have a physical organ for the reception of the idea, a man without taste can never perceive the idea of beauty, harmony, or regularity. Therefore, Hutcheson thinks that there is no development in anyone’s internals sense—you either have or not. However, since additional ideas can influence our senses, our taste can also be influenced—rationally—by customs, education, or example. Custom, education, and example can enlarge the capacity of our minds to retain and compare complex compositions, which are the ideas beyond simple ideas of sight, touch, and auditory sense—such as the idea of beauty. For example, if we expose a baby to harmonious music since he was little, it is possible that he will have greater ability in analyzing such harmonious sound, for he has been educated at a very early stage so that he has greater ability in retaining and comparing this complex composition. Nevertheless, Hutcheson says that “there is a natural power of perception, or sense of beauty in objects, antecedent to all custom, education or example” (Hutcheson 38). In other words, having influence on our internal sense does not mean that custom and education can change the fact whether we have internal sense or not. In particular, when we try to make the baby more “sensitive” to the harmony in sound, we presuppose that the baby has this internal sense, because if he does not have this internal sense, no matter how many harmonious melodies we play to him, he can never perceive the beauty in the sound. Here, I think Hutcheson is making a parallel between the deprivation of taste and of any external sense. As stated earlier, it is impossible for a blind person to receive the idea of color because he innately lacks this ability of perceiving color, regardless of how many various colors that the object has. Likewise, a person without taste can never perceive the idea of beauty, and there is nothing that we can do to change that fact. In short, Hutcheson thinks that human beings have various senses to perceive the ideas produced by external objects. In this perceiving process, our mind is passive and involuntary so that it cannot change our perception of any idea without any additional idea which turns sensible perceptions into rational perceptions. While external senses are senses perceived by distinct physical organs, internal sense is our power of perceiving the idea of beauty. This internal sense is our taste. Like external senses, taste cannot be acquired through custom, education, and example. If we want to improve someone’s taste by enlarging his capacity of retaining and comparing the idea of beauty, we have to make sure whether the person has the natural internal sense or not. On the other hand, Hume, in the Of The Standard of Taste, states that there is a great variety among people’s taste. He starts his essay by saying that “the great variety of Taste, as well as of opinions, which prevails in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen under everyone’s observation (Hume, 226).” Influenced by Hutcheson’s sentimentalism, Hume believes that aesthetic judgments do not rely on reason but on sentiments. These sentiments might refer to Hutcheson’s internal sensations. For example, one finds a harmonious music agreeable and a discordant song displeasing: our perceptions and feelings about the music are our aesthetic sentiments. Human taste is formed by these aesthetic sentiments, and it is the source of our judgments of natural, moral, as well as aesthetic beauty. It is, therefore, the foundation when we judge a work to be beautiful. Moreover, sentiment, different from reason, does not refer to the inner qualities of the object, but solely depends on the feelings of the subject himself. Hume’s idea that aesthetic sentiments are subjective relates to Hutcheson’s opinion that the idea of beauty is the perception formed in ourselves rather than merely the characteristics of an external object. Hutcheson says in his treatise that “beauty is taken for the idea raised in us, and a sense of beauty for our power of receiving the idea (Hutcheson 10).” Therefore, according to Hume, our tastes, comprised by various aesthetic judgements, are subjective and capricious. However, while Hutcheson thinks that different people are inherently the same, despite the fact that additional ideas can affect our rational perceptions of sensations, Hume seems to persist in the view that an infinite variety and caprice is innate in people’s taste. He thinks that “the variety of taste is obvious to the most careless enquirer (Hume 227).” Different people have different sentiments even when they are observing the same object: one person might be more pleased with the color of blue while another person gains pleasure from the color of cyan. Such caprice of taste also exists in the same individual at different times: what a person likes in his twenties might not appeal to him anymore when he is thirty years older. Moreover, according to Hume, the infinite variety in taste is due to people’s different sensibilities. He states that
Hutcheson might argue against Hume’s theory in that he thinks that there is not any difference in people’s sensibilities and tastes. The only difference that could exist in people’s tastes is whether one has it or not. If two people both possess the power of perceiving the idea of beauty, the sensation produced by the same object should be identical for both of them. In other words, as long as they have taste, the idea perceived by one person as pleasant should not be recognized by the other as displeasing. Moreover, Hutcheson would explain the obvious variety between the people’s perceptions by saying that different people infuse additional ideas into the merely sensible perception. For example, one person might find the dark red more pleasing because the color is related to one of his most precious memories. However, this difference, according to Hutcheson, does not exist in his sensible perception of the idea but in his rational perception of the idea, which has influence his judgement and makes him think that his taste is different from that of others. Furthermore, Hume thinks that people’s taste can be improved, particularly by sufficient practice. In the Of The Standard of Taste, Hume states that:
At least on two points, Hutcheson’s theory contradicts with Hume’s argument on the improvement of one’s taste. First, Hutcheson thinks that the strongest sensation is perceived by one at the first presence of the object. He says that “customs may make us in apprehending the truth of complex theorems, but we all find the pleasure or beauty of theorems as strong as first as ever (Hutcheson 39).” In other words, customs might enlarge our ability in apprehending more complex ideas, such as the idea of beauty, but the intuitive sensation that we gain from an object is always the strongest at its first presence. Moreover, Hutcheson would think that practice, analogous to customs, education, and example, can only improve our sensibility in rational and cognitive perception rather than merely sensible perception. He thinks that if the person in the earlier case becomes more capable at distinguishing sounds and perceiving the idea of beauty through years of practice, it is only because he knows how to analyze and apprehend these ideas rationally. Since he is not aware of the fact that it is his cognitive perception that influences judgments, he thinks that it is his sensibility that has changes. However, the seemingly obvious contradiction between Hutcheson’s and Hume’s theories can actually be reconciled if we analyze more thoroughly from their distinct positions: while Hutcheson focuses more on the intuitive and sensible aspect of taste, Hume does not distinguish the sensible part so much from the rational part. To be more specific, Hutcheson thinks that taste, which measure the ability of our internal sense, is only concerned with the immediate ideas perceived by us upon the presence of external objects. Therefore, our mind is passive and involuntary when receiving such ideas and does not have the space for any cognitive analysis or judgment. People thinks that their sensibilities can change only because they blur the idea of sensible perceptions with rational perceptions. Thus, even though we become more capable of discerning the idea of beauty though customs, education, and example, the passive reaction of mind does not change at all. On the other hand, Hume thinks that taste, which is comprised of our aesthetic sentiments, does not stand apart completely from our aesthetic judgments which concerns with rational analysis of the perception. However, the rational analysis can be infused into our intuitive perception of ideas so that, since we do not feel this analysis cognitively, we will think that there are some improvements that can be made on our sensibilities. For example, a person sees a masterpiece of painting and is told by some professional that it is aesthetically beautiful. Even though he does not “feel” that the painting is beautiful, he cognitively “knows” that it is beautiful. Hume will not consider this person has good taste because his cognition still works separately from his sense. However, if, being told by the professional, the person alters his sensibility and starts to “feel” that this painting is indeed beautiful—his mind can be calmed by the smart combination of colors, and his heart is touched by its balanced structure—then, Hume will say that the person’s taste has been improved because his sentiments towards the painting are different now. Nevertheless, there are still certain points in each theory with which I do not quite agree. For Hutcheson’s argument, I do not advocate for his analogy between external senses and the internal sense. It is true that we cannot implant a sensibility into a person who has physical flaws, however, it is not as hard to give a person an external sense as to foster an internal sense. In other words, while the ability of the external senses is inherent in a person after he has been born, the power of perceiving the idea of beauty, the internal sense, is, to a large extent, acquired. For example, if a person was born blind, he will stay blind forever and will never have the sensibility of sight, unless we conduct surgeries on his brain or replace his retina. On the other hand, the ability of perceiving the idea of beauty is not inborn with us because almost everyone did not have the sense of beauty when he was a little child. If we play a most beautiful melody to a crying baby, he might neither be attracted to the music nor strop crying, but it does not mean that the baby will not have the sense of beauty forever. As a matter of fact, he might be highly talented in music if he is exposed to elegant music constantly by his parents. Therefore, even though external senses and internal sense are both senses so that they involve certain passive reactions of the brain toward outward stimulants, internal sense depend more on fostering and practice than external senses. We can say that an external sense can never be gained by someone who has serious defects in the physical organ concerning that particular external sense, but we cannot say that the sense of beauty can never be gained by someone who does not have the sensibility—none of us is born with the sensibility of beauty. On the other hand, although I agree with Hume’s idea that practice can help improve our taste, I do not think that it is a universal solution that can be applied to any individual. Hume seems to admit that there is a natural variety in people’s sensibility and taste, but he does not address how big this natural variety is and whether it can affect each person’s potential in improving taste. To be more specific, would there be a limit for an individual in the improvement of his taste so that, no matter how much practice is received by him, his taste can no longer improve? In the previous paragraph, I claim that people’s tastes rely more on postnatal fostering than on inborn ability, however, I concede that there is a great difference in people’s capability in improving their taste. For example, there are two young people who were born in different families and raised in their own distinct way. One was born in a well-educated family so that, since he was little, his parents have taken him to different concerts and galleries in order to foster a good taste in him. However, even though through years of practice, the boy become, to a certain level, sensitive to the idea of beauty, he does not have as good a taste as expected. The other boy, who was born to a comparatively poor family, does not have so much experience in shaping his taste as the first boy. However, he is inherently more sensitive to colors and sounds so that, after he moves in a big city where more artistic experiences are provided, his taste is improved speedily and soon surpasses the taste of the first one. Although both of them have the sense of beauty and have undergone certain amount of practice, the potential in improving the taste is much greater in the second boy than in the first one. Therefore, even though practice helps us improve taste, the effect it has on different individuals still depend on the particular person’s sensibility. In conclusion, both of Hutcheson’s and Hume’s theories shed light on the issue of human taste. Hutcheson thinks that taste, or our internal sense, can be likened to our external sense in that the mind the passive when receiving the idea of beauty, and that our tastes cannot be much improved because not everyone has that sensibility. Hume, on the other hand, states that taste is the foundation of our aesthetic judgment and can be improved through abundant practice. By combining both theories and revising them critically, I draw the conclusion that taste, which cannot be not completely likened to external senses which are determined since our birth, can be improved by a certain extent depending on our natural sensibility. [1] Francis Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings. Edited by R.S.Downie, University of Glasgow [2] David Hume, Of the Standard of Taste, Essays Moral, Political and Literary. [Revised edition, edited by Eugene F. Miller. Liberty Fund Indianapolis] |
AuthorLayne |